Rising Temperatures, Rising Tensions: Geopolitics in a Warming Arctic

Jack Kayal

Once viewed as little more than a far-off frozen frontier and political backwater, the Arctic region is rapidly evolving into a flashpoint for global conflict and competition. Recent reductions in sea levels have thrust previously uninhabitable, strategically unimportant land to the forefront of international affairs. The National Snow and Ice Data Center reported that Arctic summer ice levels have declined by 13% each decade since 1979, while predicting that the Arctic will begin to experience fully ice-free summers before 2050. These developments have the potential to reshape trade routes, intensify resource competition and fundamentally alter security dynamics in the region. Accordingly, new frameworks are needed to prevent the region from becoming a militarized conflict zone. Possible measures ranging from the ratification of demilitarization agreements and the establishment of shared resource protocols among Arctic states would work to ensure stability as the region countries experience greater economic and strategic activity. 

The creation of new shipping routes resulting from climate change and melting ice will be a major international focus in the region and a potential source of significant conflict. As the ocean water in the region continues to warm, sea lanes that were once impassable due to ice are opening to international trade, providing valuable, time-saving routes in the Northern Hemisphere. By utilizing the Northern Sea Route along the Russian coast, as well as the Northwest Passage along Canada’s coast, the shipping distance between Asia and Europe could be cut by up to 40% compared to using traditional routes such as the Suez and Panama Canal routes. This change could fundamentally alter the balance of international trade and power on the high seas that has been in place since the construction of the Suez Canal in 1869. 

In 2018, the world's largest container shipper, Maersk, sent its ice-class container vessel, Venta Maersk, on a trial voyage through the Northern Sea Route to assess the passage's commercial viability. At that time, Maersk noted that the route was only feasible for about three months a year and that it did not view it as a viable commercial alternative to existing routes, although continued ice melt may change this assessment. Additionally, numerous nations have begun to assess the passage's viability in hopes of gaining access to valuable natural resources as well as to exert control and influence over the region. China, in particular, has embraced this shift through its “Polar Silk Road,” which it has integrated into its Belt and Road Initiative, a wide-reaching set of economic and political investments in infrastructure, research and development designed to expand the country's geopolitical influence. 

As nations increase their economic and political involvement in the Arctic, it is important to keep in mind that, due to the lack of previous commercial viability, the necessary infrastructure to maintain shipping lines will need to be developed. To this end, countries historically at odds with the United States have collaborated to accelerate development in the region. For instance, the Arctic largely lacks the necessary port logistics and rescue infrastructure found elsewhere in the world. The potential new shipping routes are also encouraging cooperation between nations that have historically been at odds with the United States. For example, state-owned Chinese companies such as China National Petroleum Corporation and China National Offshore Oil Corporation have both invested in Russian liquefied natural gas projects on the Yamal Peninsula to secure transport corridors in the Arctic. This level of cooperation concerning the Arctic underscores the fact that the melting ice is not only shortening shipping routes but also altering trade networks between nations. 

Similar investments in infrastructure are being made in natural resource extraction, as the region's mineral, oil, and natural gas reserves become more accessible. The Arctic is likely to contain valuable commodities such as oil, natural gas, and mineral deposits such as iron ore and copper. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that the Arctic holds 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30% of its undiscovered gas reserves. Rosneft, Russia’s state-controlled oil company, and Gazprom, one of the country's natural gas giants, are heavily invested in offshore projects in the Arctic. Additionally, Norway has continued to expand drilling efforts in the Barents Sea, further complicating the competition over resources in a relatively confined area of the world.

The geopolitical jockeying among various nations in the Arctic has exacerbated territorial disputes in the region, resulting in a complex set of jurisdictional issues. For instance, Canada, Denmark, and Russia have all submitted claims to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) over the Lomonosov Ridge, citing extended continental shelf rights under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This has produced a number of maps with conflicting boundaries of ownership beneath the Arctic seabed. These contested claims of sovereignty currently exist in a state of limbo, increasing the potential for international conflict to erupt over competing claims concerning natural resources and territorial control. 

The increasing tension among nations in the Arctic has aggravated existing rivalries and paved the way for new ones to emerge. China has designated itself a “near Arctic state,” a self-conferred title that is not internally recognized by the formal "Arctic States” designated by the Arctic Council. contributing to the sense of rivalry and tension, particularly in regards to the United States. While China lacks legal standing under UNCLOS, the Chinese government maintains that it is providing valuable scientific and commercial partnerships through research funding in Iceland and Svalbard. It may be the case, however, that China’s strategy is less about climate science and more about embedding Chinese influence in the Arctic to secure long-term access to resources. 

The race to militarize and fortify national interests at the top of the world is increasingly becoming an important prerogative for numerous nations. Russia has worked to seize the initiative by rebuilding and modernizing Cold War-era bases throughout the region. This includes its base on Franz Josef Land (an Arctic archipelago in the Barents Sea, north of Russia), where the Russian military deployed S-400 air defense systems and expanded its fleet of nuclear icebreakers. The Moscow government views the Arctic as particularly important to its strategic objectives in the Northern Hemisphere due to its usefulness as a second-strike nuclear deterrent, given the presence of its Northern Fleet and submarine bases on the nearby Kola Peninsula. 

In 2018, in response to Russia's rearming and militarization of northern island groups, NATO launched its largest military exercise in the Arctic since the 1980s. Named Trident Juncture, the exercise involved 50,000 troops, 250 aircraft, and 65 ships in Norway, testing the ability of various NATO member forces to operate together in snowy climates. Tensions rose in the area when Finland and Sweden joined NATO following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, further shifting the strategic balance in the region away from Russia and towards NATO. NATO’s increased influence in the area places additional pressure on Russia’s northern border. Competition in the region is further complicated by the unique environmental factors inherent to the Arctic, which have the potential to inflame tensions between NATO member nations and Russia. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, for example, emphasizes that the Arctic’s remoteness and lack of communication protocols increase the chance of accidental clashes and incidents. Moreover, climate change will introduce unpredictable variables foreign nations may not be prepared for, from new navigational hazards to humanitarian disasters, that could quickly entangle military actors. 

The Arctic Council remains the primary multilateral forum for governance in the Arctic region, but is limited to non-military issues such as environmental concerns and scientific research. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Council has suspended most cooperation with Moscow, further complicating its ability to adjudicate disputes in the region with a major power. UNCLOS provides a general framework for maritime law, but enforcement remains largely ineffective. Russia has at times flouted international arbitration, and the United States has never formally ratified UNCLOS despite adhering to its principles. Due to repeated issues in enforcement under UNCLOS, the Brookings Institute warns that without updated governance, Arctic institutions could fracture under the weight of great-power rivalry.

Other institutions, such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO), have adopted

the “Polar Code,” which regulates ship safety and environmental standards, but compliance is uneven among nations involved in the Arctic. Critics argue that the patchwork nature of governance throughout the Arctic region leaves too many loopholes for states to exploit, particularly regarding military deployments. Of particular note is the fact that the code does not apply to ships weighing under 500 tons or military vessels. This loophole presents a potentially inflammatory situation in which a nation's navy may conduct surveillance or other official activities while remaining outside of the jurisdiction imposed by the Polar Code. 

One potential solution might be to model new preventive frameworks on successful precedents. The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 demonstrates that agreements founded on pillars of demilitarization and science-led governance can have positive effects on geopolitics in Antarctica. The treaty was able to effectively designate Antarctica as a cooperative international zone, banning military activity, nuclear testing, and waste disposal on the continent. While treaties implemented at the height of Cold War tensions may not be directly applicable today, they do demonstrate that the spirit of cooperative sovereignty can offer valuable guidance.

A variety of strategies have been explored to reduce tensions in the region, such as adapting Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)-style prerogatives, including advance notification of military exercises, observer missions, and joint crisis communication channels between nations operating in the Arctic. Another option is establishing a regional arms-control regime, capping the number of icebreakers or missile systems stationed north of the Arctic Circle. Yet true security in the Arctic extends beyond arms control and diplomacy and must also address the human and cultural dimensions that define life in the region. 

While state actors often dominate discussions of Arctic strategy, effective governance must also account for the people who have long inhabited the region. Crucial to the creation and implementation of a functional security framework is the inclusion of these Indigenous perspectives in the governance process. The Saami Council, Inuit Circumpolar Council, and other groups have historically emphasized that Arctic security cannot be divorced from human security—protecting food systems, cultural traditions, and ecosystems. By stressing the need for involvement by indigenous communities, governance can ensure that measures reflect lived realities, not just great-power maneuvering. 

Climate change has made the Arctic a new frontline of geopolitics. Melting ice is opening trade routes, resources are drawing in new world powers to the region, and military deployments are escalating tensions. Existing institutions are ill-prepared to manage these developments, especially as tension between the West and Russia has been exacerbated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The central challenge is whether the Arctic will remain a region of science and collaboration or become yet another arena of militarized rivalry. By establishing new security frameworks grounded in preventive diplomacy, confidence-building, and inclusive governance, the international community can test whether it has the capacity to manage great-power competition in one of Earth’s most fragile regions.

(This article was originally printed in the Fall 2025 edition of our print magazine. To see the entire magazine, click here.)